A Caliph's frustration with
his emirs
By Walid Phares
October 22, 2007
Yes, Bin Laden’s latest audiotape aired on al Jazeera
is somewhat unique. Not in its ideological party line or
in the Salafi doctrinal roots. That hasn’t changed nor
is it expected to. Surely, in a previous speech he
inserted some neo Marxist and Trotskyite stuff; but that
was part of his “American” rhetoric, and possibly at the
request of his Gringo advisers. Today’s audio wasn’t
concerned about Berkeley’s approval but was dedicated to
whip the chaotic commanders of Jihad in Iraq. Usama’s
message was more so the expression of a frustrated (self
appointed) “Caliph” trying to reign in on his emirs gone
wild in the deserts of Middle Earth. The “Lord” is upset
with how al Qaeda Iraq has administered the struggle,
the people and the image. Incredibly, the number one of
al Qaeda said the المجاهدين “Mujahidins” in Iraq
committed أخطاء “mistakes.” I purposely quoted the words
in Arabic because this was indeed the first time the man
used them in this context: self criticism. In fact he
criticized the “emirs” for the recklessness of their
Jihad in the land of the two rivers. If one reviews the
public statements of Bin Laden, at least since 1996,
this would be the first time he would talk about the
Jihadists’ mistakes, not the errors by Muslim rulers in
general: Now these are his own fighters who are at fault.
The last time an al Qaeda leader came close to this
attitude was the shy warning by Ayman Zawahiri to
Zarqawi demanding that the killing of Shiia stops in
Iraq. But the top leader at the time wasn’t addressing
the mistakes of the emirs. He dealt with “higher
geopolitical matters” per the comments of Abdel Bari
Atwan on al Jazeera tonight. “Sheikh Bin Laden, said
Atwan deals with high level issues, such as the
confrontation with the United States, India etc, but
this time the Sheikh is dealing with issues on the
ground.”
Maybe not so comparable in context, but see it as a
summoning by the “Fuhrer” to his Generals after losing
Libya, Stalingrad or Normandy. The plan of the high
commander was excellent, but the commanding officers
messed it up, would be a possible analogy. Indeed since
that speech delivered on February 11, 2003 in which
Usama asked his worldwide Jihadists to prepare for Iraq
and form the expeditionary corps to fight the Kuffar (infidels)
for Baghdad, the Terror activities were scoring points:
instability, bloodshed, sectarian violence, further
recruitment, and political chaos behind enemy lines,
that is within the West, particularly in America. But
things began to change as the “generals” started to act
as owners of the land. Again on al Jazeera (swiftly
after the tape was released), another commentator
Abdelwahhab al Qassab, said the reason of the set back
was the interference of al Qaeda (foreign fighters) in
Iraqis daily lives. Qassab is right, I’d argue, the
emirs went wild in Iraq with the Sunni population,
particularly with the tribes. They went a la Khmer Rouge
with traditional communities and even with local
Islamists. On al Jazeera, other commentators said al
Qaeda and its competitors committed the errors “of
Algeria.” Interestingly this statement means loads to
the analysts who have observed the civil war in Algeria
in the 1990s. The mainstream Front Islamique du Salut (Slavation
Islamic Front) first, then its first off shoot, the
“Armed Islamic Groupings” and lastly the second
generation off shoot “Salafi Group of Call and Combat;”
all of them going from extreme to more extremism, got
themselves involved in a mass bloodshed with the
Algerian population. Ironically the academic elite in
the West, lost in the labyrinth of interpretation,
portrayed the Algerian Jihadists as an interim force for
change (!) Stunningly, it is al Qaeda today -in the
words of Bin Laden- which is stating that the Algerian
type of reckless Jihadism is irresponsible. This is so
telling in terms of the Western failure in reading the
barbarism of the Salafists in the 1990s, and in doubling
this failure of analysis by asserting since 2003 that al
Qaeda Iraq is an expression of the Iraqis opposing the
“foreign occupation.”
Well, here we have the chief of the organization
telling the world that excesses were committed in Iraq,
which led to divisions and to alienating tribes and
urban communities. Indeed, in his letter to the “Iraqi
people” Bin Laden is asking -ironically- for a change of
direction by his own followers. Actually, for more
precision the audio message’s title doesn’t use the term
شعب العراق Shaab al Iraq ,
accurately translated into the people of Iraq but the
term لأهل العراق “ahl al Iraq”
which would translate into: population, communities or
even the inhabitants, as an ideological indication that
Iraqis aren’t a people of their own but a segment of the
Umma (Islamic Nation). His linguistic game aims at
telling his audience that local and transnational
Jihadis are in fact one in their struggle. In short here
are his points:
1. All Jihadists -read also Islamists- in Iraq must
unify; meaning all power struggles should cease.
2. “Mistakes” were made indeed and they need to be
corrected.
3. The “tribes” cannot be marginalized and made into
enemies. They should be recuperated.
4. Clerics, with strong fatwas should be the mentors
of the reunified Jihadi movement.
5. The main new direction is that the Jamaa (read the
collectivity) primes over the selfish leadership of one
or multiple emirs. That’s the bottom line.
6. Last but not least, all Jihadists must come to a
center of gravity where everyone has to make a
concession.
Always on al Jazeera, yet another commentator Dhaya'
Rashwan said that Bin laden is telling his supporters in
Iraq to make concessions on few things and unite with
all other insurgents to defeat the US. And as in magic,
Abdelrahman al Jabburi -the spokesperson of the “Iraqi
resistance,” a competitive group, called in (al Jazeera)
and declared that “indeed local Jihadists must seize the
opportunity and reorganize, unite.” Almost as in a
captivating movie, in about three hours, the master of
al Qaeda had his message aired, the commentators were
ready to make very focused analysis -of what it means-
and leaders from inside Iraq calling in and approving.
The audio message was few minutes long while the whole
back and forth debate was few hours long.
At the end of the day, this tape show -as I have
argued since last summer- that al Qaeda central feels
that their strategic initiative in Iraq is lagging
behind. Two things went wrong for al Qaeda: One was the
misbehavior of its own barons on the ground, and two
-one can see it clearer now- the (US led) surge has
worked so far. The Jihadi combat machine is flying low
and is going through turbulences. Any major decision in
Washington can accentuate this direction down or release
it up. Ben Ladin has taken the risk of exposing this
reality to his foes. It should be read thoroughly and
responsibly inside the beltway.
*****
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future
Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies in Washington and the author of The War
of Ideas.
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/10/a_caliphs_frustration_with_his.php |
