PRINTER-FRIENDLY VERSION
Published 05 Sep 07
Iran's plan for Iraq
by Walid Phares, Ph.D.
World Defense Review columnist
[Part one of a series on "Freedom
Lines," adapted from seminars conducted for the U.S.
House of Representatives' Caucus on Counter
Terrorism, summer 2007]
In March 2003, the United States made a strategic
decision to send troops into Iraq and defeat the
Saddam Hussein regime militarily. This decision is
still being debated nationwide and internationally
as to its legitimacy and rationality.
One camp claims Washington didn't have a right to
change the regime and engage in an armed
confrontation with Iraqis. Another camp says Saddam
was a threat, the region is now better off without
him, and Iraqis have been liberated from a bloody
dictatorship.
|
Above, general Directions of
the Iranian Syrian Plan for Post Withdrawal
Iraq.
Above, advances by
1. Iran: Center, South and Saudi and Jordanian
borders; pressure on the Kurds in the North
2. Syria: Anbar, limits of Sunni Triangle,
pressure on Kurds
3. Turkey: Tentative: Pressure on the Kurds
Above, final advances
1. Iran: Central, South, West
2. Syria: Anbar, borders enclaves
3. Al Qaeda and Jihadists: in the Center |
In reality, only historians will determine if it
was the right decision at the right time for one
simple reason: While U.S. military operations aimed
at dismantling the regime's military power ended in
April 2003 – very successfully as a matter of fact –
the second much longer road for the following set of
U.S. goals is now under scrutiny.
Should American and Coalition forces withdraw
immediately, begin pulling out, or staying the
course, is the center of the ongoing debate. But to
answer, one has to understand the goals of the
adversaries in this ongoing conflict. Al Qaeda has a
plan for Iraq, and U.S. forces are fighting it along
with Iraqi units. But the direct geopolitical threat
that is linked to the role of U.S. troops in that
country is the Iranian regime and its allies in the
region and inside Iraq. How does Tehran see the
American presence, what are its plans for Iraq, and
what will happen if U.S. forces are withdrawn
abruptly?
Prior to 2001, the Iranian regime had developed
regional ambitions, including a military alliance
with Syria, continuous support of Hezbollah in
Lebanon and a slow-pace development of a nuclear
weapon. In the 1980s, its proxies delivered blows to
the U.S. in Beirut and by May 2000, its allies in
Lebanon had reached international borders with
Israel.
During the decade following the first Gulf War,
the Pasdaran were training and arming Iraqi militias
for future mission in Iraq. The Khomeinists and
Hafez Assad had an Iraq plan years before the U.S.
invaded in 2003: overrun the Shia areas in the
center and the south and open a land bridge between
Iran and Syria.[1] But 9/11 shook off the
foundations of the Iranian plan. By December of that
year, U.S. and Coalition forces removed the Taliban
and opened the path for a democratic government in
Afghanistan.
The regime change in Kabul was a first problem
for the Mullahs in Tehran: democracy defeating a
Jihadi regime wasn't a good example to watch. By
April 2003, a second catastrophe hit the Islamic
Republic: Saddam was removed, but worse, democratic
elections were succeeding each other in Iraq. But
more dramatic was the fact that U.S and NATO forces
were deployed to the East and to the West of Iran.
In strategic reading, the Khomeinist project was
geographically contained: no more bridge to Syria
and a greater menace was hovering over the nuclear
program. Even more catastrophic was the proximity of
two democratic experiments to the Iranian society.
Students, women and workers have been challenging
the theocratic regime since the late 1990s.
To Khamanei's ruling elite, successes across the
borders meant a condemnation to the regime inside
Iran. Thus the Pasdaran were tasked with a plan to
destabilize Afghanistan and crumble the political
process in Iraq. Since the summer of 2003 and for
the following four years, Iranian backed Terrorism
against civilians, Syrian passage for the Jihadists
and pressures against U.S. and Coalition forces
aimed at provoking a quicker and chaotic pull out.
If Washington withdraws catastrophically from
Iraq what would the Iranian regime do? In about six
to nine months, this is what would happen:
- The pro-Iranian militias (SCIRI, Badr Brigade,
Muqtada al Sadr, act.) would seize the control of
two thirds of Iraq between Baghdad and Basra. The
militias would create "security enclaves," perform
several terror acts and assassinations leading to
a crumbling of the central Government, and a
pro-Khomeinist regime established.
- Most moderate Shiite politicians and liberal
elements in those areas would be eliminated, as
did Khomeini with his partners in the Iranian
Revolution in 1979. Within less than a year, most
Shia partners of the Pro-Iranian forces would be
eliminated.
- And as it was practiced in Lebanon in 1990,
the pro-Iranian future regime of Iraq will call in
Iranian "brotherly" forces to assist in security
and in the defense of the borders. The Pasdaran
and the Iranian army will deploy in the southern
Oil fields, along the borders with Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Jordan and would connect with the
Syrian forces across the borders. The latter will
be asked to help in the Anbar province.
- The Sunni areas will be left to be dealt with
later, along with Syrian interventions.
- The Kurdish areas will be submitted to
isolation, pressure and internal divisions, in a
concerted effort with Syria and the Islamic
Government of Turkey.
This is not a theoretical scenario. This is the
projected reality if U.S. forces would prematurely
and abruptly withdraw from Iraq before achieving one
major strategic objective in Iraq and the region:
Helping the independently minded Iraqis to reform
and solidify their Government, erect their Army to a
regional level and along with U.S. forces establish
a containment system for Iranian expansionist
ambitions. Any lesser goal achieved in Iraq is a
direct invitation to the Iranian regime to become
the greatest threat in the 21st century against
Peace and Security, in the region and worldwide.
[1] See Phares, Walid "The
Syrian-Iranian Axis" Global Affairs. Spring
1992.
— Dr. Walid Pharees is a senior fellow with
the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD)
in Washington, D.C., and director of the Future
Terrorism Project of the FDD. He is a visiting
fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in
Brussels. His most recent books are Future
Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West (2006)
and The War of Ideas: Terrorist Strategies
against the West (2007).
Dr. Phares holds degrees in law and political
science from Saint Joseph University and the
Lebanese University in Beirut, a Masters in
international law from the Universite de Lyons in
France and a Ph.D. in international relations and
strategic studies from the University of Miami.
He has taught and lectured at numerous
universities worldwide, practiced law in Beirut, and
served as publisher of Sawt el-Mashreq and Mashrek
International. He has taught Middle East political
issues, ethnic and religious conflict, and
comparative politics at Florida Atlantic University
until 2006. He has been teaching Jihadi strategies
at the National Defense University since 2007.
Dr. Phares has written eight books on the
Middle East and published hundreds of articles in
newspapers and scholarly publications such as
Global Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, the Journal
of South Asian and Middle East Studies and the
Journal of International Security. He has
appeared on CNN, MSNBC, Fox News, NBC, CBS, ABC, PBS,
BBC, al Jazeera, al Hurra, al Arabiya, as well as on
many radio broadcasts.
Aside from serving on the boards of several
national and international think tanks and human
rights associations, Dr. Phares has testified before
the US Senate Subcommittees on the Middle East and
South East Asia, the House Committees on
International Relations and Homeland Security and
regularly conducts congressional and State
Department as well as European Parliament and UN
Security Council briefings.
Visit Dr. Phares on the web at
walidphares.com
and
defenddemocracy.org.
© 2007 Walid Phares
—
Also by Walid Phares:
•
Iran's plan for Iraq [05
Sep 07]
•
Military Jihad in modern times is illegal
[31 Jul 07]
•
Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad
[18 Jul 07]
•
The Car Bomb Jihad: Is Britain seeing clearly?
[02 Jul 07]
•
Palestinians: "Taliban" versus "Mujahideen"?
[26 Jun 07]
•
Syro-Iranian massacre of politicians in Lebanon
[16 Jun 07]
•
The Syrian-Jihadi "highway" in Lebanon
[02 Jun 07]
•
Losing the War in Congress: Not in Iraq
[24 Apr 07]
•
Royal Navy incident: The larger plan of Teheran's
regime [26 Mar 07]
•
A Muslim Resistance against Jihad?
[08 Mar 07]
•
London warning: A new step in Jihad Terror
[08 Feb 07]
•
President Bush's new plan: Redirecting Iraq's
campaign [29 Jan 07]
•
FUTURE JIHAD – Terrorist Strategies against the West
and other Democracies [11
Jan 07]
•
Hezbollah offensive in Lebanon: Days One, Two, and
Three [08 Dec 06]
•
On Iraq: Listen carefully to General Abizaid
[20 Nov 06]
•
Hezbollah's offensive in Lebanon has begun
[13 Nov 06]
•
The "Caliph-strophic" Debate
[23 Oct 06]
•
The Continued Misunderstanding of the Salafi Jihad
Threat [09 Oct 06]
•
U.S. Embassy: Assad allows attack, offers "protection"
and aims at confusion [13
Sep 06]
•
Hezbollah's Political Blitzkrieg
[14 Aug 06]
•
Israeli targets in Lebanon
[27 Jul 06]
•
Zarqawi: Killing the future chief of al Qaida
[09 Jun 06]
•
From London to Toronto: Dismantling cells, dodging
their ideology [05 Jun 06]
•
The Strategic Waves of Iraq's Liberation
[01 May 06]
•
Are you ready for Hezbollah's Preemptive Terror?
[10 Apr 06]
•
A Jihad window at the Emirates' gate?
[28 Feb 06]
•
Osama's unmistakable message
[26 Jan 06]
•
The US and Pakistan
Allies or Not Allies Is the Question
[16 Jan 06]
•
Catch them, but do not watch them!
Spying on al Qaeda in America
[20 Dec 05]
•
Iraqi Victory, American Achievement
The October 15 Referendum
[17 Oct 05]
•
Debate on al Qaida's losses in Iraq
Newsweek's speedy conclusions lead to analytical
crash [29 Sep 05]
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